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Abstract 
The concept of teamworking is the product of two distinct developments. One: a neo-
Tayloristic form of organization of work, of which Toyota has shown that it can be very profitable, was 
packaged and reframed to make it acceptable to the Western public. Two: anti-Tayloristic ways of 
organizing work, inspired by ideals of organizational democracy, were relabeled to make these 
acceptable to profit-oriented managers. 
Drawing on empirical research in Scandinavia, Germany, The Netherlands and the UK, as 
well as on published case studies of Japanese companies, the paper develops a neo-Tayloristic and an 
anti-Tayloristic model of teamworking. 
Key concerns in the teamworking literature are intensification of work and the use of shop 
floor autonomy as a cosmetic or manipulative device. Indeed, all the features of neo-Tayloristic 
teamworking are geared towards the intensification of work. However, one of the intensification 
mechanisms, the removal of Tayloristic rigidities in the division of labor, applies to anti-Tayloristic 
teamworking as well. This poses a dilemma for employee representatives. In terms of autonomy, on the 
other hand, the difference between neo-Tayloristic and anti-Tayloristic teamworking is real. 
In anti-Tayloristic teamworking, there is no supervisor inside the team. The function of 
spokesperson rotates. All team members can participate in decision-making. Standardization is not 
relentlessly pursued; management accepts some measure of worker control. There is a tendency to 
alleviate technical discipline, e.g. to find alternatives for the assembly line. Buffers are used. 
Remuneration is based on proven skill level; there are no group bonuses. 
In contrast, in neo-Tayloristic teamworking, a permanent supervisor is present in the team as 
team leader. At most, only the team leader can participate in decision-making. Standardization is 
relentlessly pursued. Management prerogatives are nearly unlimited. Job designers treat technical 
discipline, e.g. short-cycled work on the assembly line, as unproblematic. There are no buffers. A 
substantial part of wages consists of individual bonuses based on assessments by supervisors on how 
deeply workers cooperate in the system. Group bonuses are also given. 
The instability and vulnerability of anti-Tayloristic teamworking imply that it can only 
develop and flourish when managers and employee representatives put determined effort into it. The 
opportunity structure for this contains both economic and political elements. In mass production, the 
economic success of Toyota, through skillful mediation by management gurus, makes the opportunity 
structure for anti-Tayloristic teamworking relatively unfavorable.  
 
Introduction 
An important strand in the current research literature on teamworking supports 
the following sweeping statement: maybe with the exception of a few doomed 
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experiments, teamworking means intensification of work by removing some of the 
rigidities of the Tayloristic division of labor; autonomy in teamworking is either 
cosmetic or part of a managerial control strategy that is cheaper and more insidious 
than classical direct control. On the basis of published case studies, for example 
(Ezzamel and Willmott, 1998, Barker, 1993, Pollert, 1996) it seems safe to conclude 
that this tendency at least exists. It is unclear to what extent this is inevitable. The 
purpose of this paper is to explore the space for organizational choice in teamworking.  
The rise of teamworking as a popular topic is the result of two distinct 
symbolic transformation processes that occurred more or less simultaneously. The 
Toyota Production System was the starting point of one of these transformations. 
During the 1980s, Western researchers discovered that the Toyota Production System 
was a highly productive alternative to classical Tayloristic mass production. Womack, 
Jones and Roos (1990) generalized the Toyota Production System by inventing a new 
name for it that does not refer to the Toyota Motor Company: "lean production".  This 
terminological innovation helped elevate them to fame.  
Womack, Jones and Roos (1990: 99) associated the Toyota Production System 
with teamworking by stating that "the dynamic work team" is "the heart of the lean 
factory". They also suggest that in lean production it is essential that managers 
delegate responsibility to the teams: "Our studies of plants trying to adopt lean 
production reveal that workers respond only when there exists some sense of 
reciprocal obligation, a sense that management actually values skilled workers, will 
make sacrifices to retain them, and is willing to delegate responsibility to the team" 
(Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990: 99). 
On closer inspection, the association made by Womack cs. of teamworking 
with the Toyota Production System a.k.a. lean production seems somewhat of a 
fabrication. For example, there is no reference to teams whatsoever in the seminal 
exposition produced by Taiichi Ohno (1988), the chief creator of the Toyota 
Production System after 1945. The confusion about teamworking in Japan was noted 
by Dankbaar (1997: 577) who explained: "The Japanese notion of 'teamwork' refers to 
a sense of responsibility for the whole enterprise ('Team Toyota'), and to mutual aid 
and off-line improvement activities [..]. It does not refer to working in teams." 
Thus the association of teamworking with lean production is a myth, albeit a 
functional myth. It is a functional myth because the proponents of implementing the 
Toyota Production System in the West faced a formidable handicap: the bad name 
that the Toyota Production System had in terms of quality of working life. The 
Western public had been forewarned about this by Satoshi Kamata, who recorded half 
a year of experience as a Toyota worker in "Japan on the passing lane". Kamata 
(1983: 87) described his work and that of his colleagues as: "a kind of lobotomy." 
The term "team" is attractive because it connotes rewarding types of activity. 
It brings the vocabulary of sports and professionalism (“medical team”, “team of 
scientists”) to the factory and the office floors. 
It was exactly in this context that Womack, Jones and Roos (1990: 14) 
introduced the term "team" when they wrote: “lean production calls for learning far 
more professional skills and applying these creatively in a team setting rather than in a 
rigid hierarchy.” 
Thus the topic of teamworking got a major impetus from efforts to increase 
the Western public’s acceptance of the Toyota Production System. 
However, there was also a completely different movement that, too, helped 
make the term “teamworking” important. A cluster of anti-Tayloristic reform 
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activities, predominantly undertaken in Europe (including the UK), was the starting 
point of this movement. 
Anti-Taylorism involves consciously moving towards job enrichment instead 
of division of labor and towards a reduction of the separation of conception and 
execution. It also means choosing to use human skills instead of trying to incorporate 
these into information systems. It further entails striving towards worker autonomy 
and codetermination instead of increasing discipline. 
Anti-Taylorism does not necessarily mean putting the quality of working life 
before productivity. Anti-Taylorism takes improvement of the quality of working life 
as a condition for improvement of performance. Anti-Tayloristic programs were (and 
are) sociotechnical systems design, Industrial Democracy and Humanization of 
working life (Germany).  
A common characteristic of organizations that introduced anti-Tayloristic 
reforms is an emphasis on (semi)- autonomous teams. Gradually, the adjective 
"autonomous" was stripped off. “Teamworking” came to be used as a metonym for 
anti-Tayloristic forms of work organization. In this way, the reform aspect was 
deemphasized. A second reason for using teamworking as a metonym was simplicity. 
Over time, modern sociotechnical systems design theory had become wildly 
complicated (cf. Eijnatten 1993). When asked whether this complexity was an 
obstacle to its diffusion, a leading developer/consultant working within the Modern 
Sociotechnical systems design paradigm in the Netherlands explained: "we just talk 
about teamworking". And Appelbaum and Batt (1994: 125) coined the term 
“American team production” to label a production model that "combines the 
principles of Swedish sociotechnical systems and self-directed work with those of 
quality engineering". 
Thus, the second symbolic transformation process involves making a concept 
that was rooted in social reform, and furthermore theoretically sophisticated, 
managerially acceptable.  
To summarize: teamworking is the point where two movements intersect: a 
movement for making a managerially attractive concept - the Toyota production 
system - socially acceptable and movement for making a socially attractive concept - 
anti-Taylorism in its various forms - managerially acceptable. The double lineage of 
the teamworking concept gives rise to internal contradictions and confusion.  
A fairly common strategy for making sense of teamworking is to make a 
distinction between two models. 
Pollert (1996: 190), for example, distinguishes a hierarchically dominated 
Japanese version from a participatory, democratic Swedish model. 
Danford (1998: 412) also mentions two models of teamworking: "Japanese 
Style" vs. "alternative, more autonomous models."  
In Lucio, Jenkins and Noon's (2000) account of union responses to 
management use of the teamworking concept at the Royal Mail in the UK, we see a 
distinction between on the one hand teamworking as a means to increase competition 
between employees, and on the other hand “alternative understandings of employee 
empowerment and non-competitive group work as seen in parts of the Swedish or 
German industrial relations contexts” (Lucio, Jenkins and Noon, 2000: 276). 
Schumann (1998: 24-26) distinguishes “Taylorized structurally conservative group 
work” and the “Structurally innovative model of group work”. 
These dichotomies point to an important fork in the road of job design that 
needs to be explored further.  
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Conceptual problems 
Benders and Van Hootegem (1999) provided a critical examination of existing 
dichotomies of teamworking. Two of the flaws that they highlight are: a bias towards 
autonomy and a car industry bias. However, these two problems seem minor when we 
realize that what Benders and Van Hootegem (1999: 609) call the "team discussion” 
is not about teams in general, but about teams against the backdrop of Taylorism. 
Lack of autonomy is one of Taylorism’s key problems and the car industry is its 
paradigmatic locus. 
Also, Benders and Van Hootegem (1999) indicate that dichotomies of 
teamworking are plagued by pervasive problems of definition (should we call the top 
figure in a work unit a foreman or a team leader, can a work unit be called self-
managing if it is semi-autonomous but concentrates decision-making power in one 
person, do tasks have to rotate or might a team also consist of specialists 
complementing one another). Meanings will continue to shift because of constant 
reinterpretation by practitioners (Benders and Van Hootegem 1999: 623). Because of 
its appeal, inflationary use of the term "teams" is to be expected. 
In this paper, I approach the definition problem by starting out from classical 
Taylorism. Key economic problems of Taylorism are that it involves an expensive set 
of supervisors and that it entails a lack of flexibility (and thus a dependency on 
economies of scale). The problems of Taylorism spur attempts to modify it (neo-
Taylorism) and as well as attempts to break with it (anti-Taylorism) (Pruijt, 2000). 
Neo-Taylorism is a strategy that addresses the key economic problems of Taylorism, 
while keeping the two core attractions of Taylorism intact: the promise that the best 
possible way will be uniformly used, and the promise to address what Taylor called 
"systematic soldiering". 
Accordingly, I distinguish two types of teamworking: a neo-Tayloristic type, 
with roots in Japan, versus an anti-Tayloristic type, with roots in (among other places) 
Scandinavia. A further reason for using the labels "Anti-Tayloristic teamworking" and 
"Neo-Tayloristic teamworking" is to detach the models from their geographical roots. 
This precludes being sidetracked into the question to what extent the models fit to the 
realities of Japan and Sweden.1 
 
Determinism 
Benders and Van Hootegem (1999) pointed out that in the literature there is a 
tendency to include variables that relate to characteristics of the product, such as 
required skill levels. They say that this leads to confusion and may be misleading. 
However, a worse problem is that it may lead to determinism. A typology is more 
than just an analytical instrument; there is widespread acceptance of the notion of 
“horizontal fit”, i.e. that a coherent set of practices is more effective than application 
of a few isolated elements of a model (Appelbaum et al., 2000: 32-36). In other 
words, sticking to the pure type promises success, mixing and matching elements of 
different types is a recipe for failure. 
If we would include a high level of skill as a characteristic of the anti-Taylorist 
type of teamworking, we would almost imply that this type is geared to diversified 
quality production rather than to mass production. And the extent to which certain 
output characteristics require certain organizational characteristics is a matter of 
experimentation and debate; building determinism in the conceptual tools can hardly 
be helpful.  
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One way to attenuate the deterministic tendency in typology-building is to 
increase the number of types. Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) present a six-way 
typology of production models. In this typology the Honda model, based on a strategy 
of creating innovative products and flexibility, appears as an interesting alternative to 
Toyotism (which is based on a strategy of cost reduction with constant volumes). 
In this paper, I tried to steer clear of determinism by excluding from the 
variables that make up the typology anything that is related to output characteristics.  
 
Structure of the paper 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First I concentrate on the similarities 
between the two models. Although the two models were chosen to be as far apart as 
possible, when we compare the two models to classical Taylorism, two common 
features stand out: a certain type of intensification is inextricably linked to 
teamworking; and in both types of teamworking there is integration of first level 
managerial work and production work.  
Then the paper turns to the differences between the models. The question is: 
how cosmetic are the special properties that make anti-Tayloristic teamworking 
different from neo-Tayloristic teamworking? The possibility that autonomy is a 
refined managerial control strategy, the brave new team thesis, is considered next. 
The last question addressed is: is anti-Tayloristic teamworking, in as far as it is 
not cosmetic nor a refined managerial control strategy, stable? Or is neo-Taylorism 
the winning model, the end of history?  
Empirical grounding of the models  
In order be relevant, both models of teamworking should be empirically 
grounded. This implies that the anti-Tayloristic model of teamworking should have 
features that not only go against the grain of Taylorism, but that can also be shown to 
work in practice. Also, it should be possible to find cases in which all characteristics 
are present. For the empirical grounding of the anti-Tayloristic model I made use of 
data on sixty-two cases in which managers and organization experts tried to create 
alternative ways of working. Employee representatives supported these initiatives. I 
had collected this information as part of a wider research project on change efforts 
that had at least one of the following goals: reduction of the separation of conception 
and execution; using human skills instead of trying to incorporate these into 
information systems; enhancing worker autonomy and co-determination instead of 
increasing discipline. 
Sources for cues for cases were the literature and expert advice. The intention 
was to collect information that pertained to real change on the shop floor level rather 
than to ideological window-dressing. A large part of the information came from 
published and unpublished case studies and internal company documents. I 
supplemented written information by conducting interviews. Where possible, I sought 
to enhance validity by collecting information from different sources and parties. The 
book that resulted from the study (Pruijt 1997) contains a general evaluation of the 
change projects. What I present in this article is a reexamination of the data in the 
context of teamworking. This involved focusing on the way in which workers 
cooperate in work groups and the conditions for this. The neo-Tayloristic model is 
based on literature about the Japanese automobile industry. The literature on Japanese 
companies tends to be plagued by deep ambiguity (cf. Berggren 1993). I tried to 
counter this obstacle by concentrating on claims that were sustained by solid 
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examples. Suitable in depth case studies of Japanese shop floor organization seemed 
rare. Apparently, Japanese companies tended to shield themselves against prying 
looks (Grønning, 1996). Therefore, I would like to record my admiration for those 
colleagues who, with dogged determination, shed light on the shop floor realities in 
these companies. The two models, juxtaposed to classical Taylorism, are summarized 
in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Classical Taylorism vs. anti-Tayloristic and neo-Tayloristic teamworking 
 Classical Taylorism Anti-Tayloristic 
teamworking. 
Neo-Tayloristic 
teamworking. 
Division of labor Relatively strict. 
Imbalances and 
disturbances cause 
idle time. 
Less strict. Jobs 
larger, less 
demarcation. 
Functional flexibility 
precludes idle time. 
Less strict. Jobs 
larger, less 
demarcation. 
Functional flexibility 
precludes idle time. 
Supervision No integration of 
production and 
management at all. 
No supervisor inside 
team. Some 
management 
functions are 
distributed among 
team members, often 
in the form of 
spokesperson 
rotation. 
Supervisor present in 
team as team leader. 
The team leader 
performs production 
work as well. 
Decision-making Managers decide. All team members 
can participate in 
decision-making. 
At the most, only the 
team leader can 
participate in 
decision-making. 
Standardization Relentlessly pursued. Not relentlessly 
pursued. 
Relentlessly pursued. 
Power balance Conflicts and games. Management accepts 
some measure of 
worker control. 
Nearly unlimited 
management 
prerogatives. 
Technical and 
logistical context 
Technical discipline, 
e.g. short-cycled 
work on the assembly 
line is a logical part 
of the system. 
Buffers exist as way 
of dealing with 
imbalances caused by 
the rigid division of 
labor. 
Tendency to alleviate 
technical discipline, 
e.g. to find 
alternatives for the 
assembly line. 
Buffers help create 
the conditions for 
autonomy. 
Technical discipline, 
e.g. short-cycled 
work on the assembly 
line is not seen as a 
problem. No buffers. 
Wage system The variable part of 
the wage is in a 
predictable, 
bureaucratically 
Pay on the basis of 
proven skill level. No 
group bonuses. 
Individual bonuses 
based on assessments 
by supervisor on how 
deeply a worker 
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regulated way related 
to performance. 
cooperates in the 
system. Group 
bonuses are also 
given. 
    
 
 
 
Intensification inextricably linked to teamworking 
Let us now return to proposition that teamworking means intensification of 
work by removing some the rigidities of the Tayloristic division of labor and that 
autonomy on the shop floor level is a low cost management tool for extracting effort.  
If this were true, both models of teamworking of the anti-Tayloristic variety 
would entail intensification of work.  
Juxtaposing the two models, as shown in table 1, allows us to examine not 
only differences but also commonalties between the two models. When compared to 
classical Taylorism, both models have in common that the division of labor is less 
strict. Jobs are larger; there is less demarcation between tasks. Functional flexibility 
precludes idle time. 
In accounts of the Toyota production system we can see this intensification 
mechanism quite clearly. As Ohno explains, a goal of the Toyota Production System 
is: cost reduction independent of economies of scale. This implies a constant search 
for ways to decrease the number of hours worked per product, independently from 
volume: "in business, we are always concerned with how to produce more with fewer 
workers" (Ohno, 1988: 67). The way in which Ohno looked at workers boils down to 
distinguishing "work" from "waste". His ideal was that the movements of the workers 
consist for a hundred per cent of work that adds value to the product. One of the forms 
of waste that should be eliminated is waste through waiting. A way of eliminating 
waiting is letting one worker control several machines simultaneously. Grønning 
(1992: 33) reports that balance delay, causing idle time, is not accepted. Training in 
multifunctionality is one of the means used to tackle this problem. Kenny and Florida 
(1988: 131-132) state that “work roles overlap, and tasks are assigned to groups of 
workers, who then reallocate them internally.”  
Also in some of the cases of anti-Tayloristic teamworking there were indications that 
work intensification occurred. At Felten & Guillaume, a German producer of parts for 
electrical installations, the workload had increased as a result of job enlargement and 
a reduction in personnel (Theerkorn, 1991: 234). Employees at the Volvo Uddevalla 
plant reported (in spring 1990) that people were working under great pressure. 
Absentee rates had risen to twelve per cent. Nevertheless, teams had to produce the 
same number of cars at all times, regardless of the number of people present.  
Increased work intensity in Volvo and Saab plants was also reported by C. 
Berggren (quoted in Sandberg et al., 1992: 71). In the Netherlands, employees at the 
IHC shipyard and at the paint factory Sigma Coatings spontaneously pointed out that 
work was intensified. In these two cases, the increased versatility of employees made 
interruptions vanish. In this respect, there is no difference between neo-Tayloristic 
and anti-Tayloristic teamworking: to the extent that the balancing losses associated 
with a Tayloristic organization of production decrease, idle time - sometimes a 
welcome break - disappears.  
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Job demarcations based on craft can offer workers some protection (Danford, 
1998). This kind of protection is bound to disappear in any kind of teamworking. The 
same holds for job demarcations based on seniority (Blyton and Bacon, 1997). 
Anti-Taylorist cases are not free of job losses either. For 42 per cent of the 
cases in the dataset that I prepared (Pruijt, 1997), there was information available on 
the effect on the volume of employment. In 26.9 per cent of these cases, there was a 
reduction of employment. This reduction averaged on 26.7 per cent.  
Consistent with these results, Kuhlmann and Schumann (2001: 197) found that 
most workers experience higher performance requirements compared to before the 
introduction of teamwork.  
Unions tend to have little difficulty with job enrichment, in contrast with work 
intensification and job losses (McCabe and Black, 1997). The preference for job 
enrichment makes anti-Taylorist teamworking a natural choice for unions, however 
this does not provide an escape from intensification and job losses: for unions, 
teamworking poses a dilemma. 
I have argued that both in neo-Tayloristic and anti-Tayloristic teamworking 
there is intensification due to the disappearance of balancing loss-related idle time.  
Nevertheless, it seems logical to expect that a high level of autonomy (as in 
anti-Tayloristic teamworking) provides workers with better opportunities for coping 
with high demands without suffering from unhealthy stress (Karasek and Theorell, 
1990). Appelbaum et al. (2000: 198), in their survey of workers in steel, apparel and 
medical imaging, did not find that participatory structures lead to more stress; rather, 
autonomy seemed to reduce stress. However, one has to consider the potentially 
stressful effect of increased individual accountability, which autonomy entails.  
Integration of first level management and production work 
A second, not as widely noted similarity between the two models is the 
integration of first level management and production work. 
Both models can be seen as answers to one of the great drawbacks of classical 
Taylorism that had already hindered Taylor himself: Taylorism is expensive because 
it entails creating jobs for non-value adding supervisors and other indirect workers. 
Taylor wanted to subdivide the work that was usually performed by a single gang 
boss among eight men: route clerks, instruction card clerks, cost and time clerks, gang 
bosses, speed bosses, inspectors, repair bosses and a shop disciplinarian (Taylor, 
1964: 104). Taylorism was not just a movement for efficiency by also a movement for 
providing jobs in the production process for the middle class (Merkle, 1980). In 1901, 
when the United States Steel Corporation took over the cradle of Taylorism, 
Bethlehem Steel, it laid off sixty specialized foremen (Kanigel, 1997: 355). To 
Taylor's dismay, the high costs led employers to dilute the model (Bloemen, 1988: 
41). 
Both neo-Tayloristic & anti-Tayloristic teamworking provide an opportunity 
for saving money by integrating first level management and production. However, the 
method of integrating first level management and production is different. In anti-
Tayloristic teamworking, some of the workers take on management duties alongside 
their work in production. In neo-Tayloristic teamworking, first level supervisors do 
production work as well. This feature of neo-Taylorist teamworking might be used to 
cut overall labor costs without intensifying the operatives’ work. 
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Cosmetic autonomy? 
It is difficult to establish whether a change is cosmetic or significant. Therefore I will 
try to specify how - in terms of autonomy and the conditions for autonomy - anti-
Taylorist teamworking differs from neo-Tayloristic teamworking. I will consider the 
following areas: supervision, decision-making, standardization, power balance, 
technical and logistical context and wage system. 
 
Supervision 
In neo-Taylorist teamworking, as exemplified by Toyota, each team has one 
permanent team leader. In this system, “team leader” is a misleading label for a first 
level supervisor who does double duty: supervising and (from time to time) working 
on the line as well. This is the only difference between a neo-Taylorist style team 
leader and a Taylorist low-level supervisor (Grønning, 1992: 135). 
In contrast to neo-Tayloristic teamworking, in many of the anti-Tayloristic cases, 
more than one team member took part in managerial activities. Often, the leading 
position in the team rotated. An indication that team leader rotation can be more than 
cosmetic, is that employees pressed for it. In one case (the IHC shipyard) 
management wanted to have two permanent coordinators per team. The works council 
was opposed to this and felt that the role of coordinator had to rotate among team 
members. The works council convinced management that this was the way to do it.  
There were two types of management-imposed limitations on team leader rotation: 
generally, employees needed a certain agreed upon qualification to be able to become 
team leader/coordinator/spokesman; in one case (the IHC shipyard), managers had the 
possibility to take away someone’s coordinator status, if the latter did not set a good 
example for his coworkers.  
Apart from team leader rotation, there is also another way of involving more than one 
team member in managerial activities: areas of managerial responsibility can be 
divided up over several team members. 
 
Decision-making  
In Neo-Taylorist teamworking, in as far as there is any discretionary power delegated 
to the team level, it is the team leader who makes the decisions (Grønning, 1992: 119, 
Grønning, 1990: 44-45). Some authors, for example (Fukuyama, 1995), feel that the 
Toyota production system involves the delegation of decision-making authority to 
workers. The key piece of evidence is that each worker has the right to stop the 
assembly line. Fukuyama claims that this arrangement puts the assembly line workers 
in control of their own actions (Fukuyama, 1995). However, one may ask how 
different this statement is from claiming that access to emergency brake handles puts 
railway passengers in control. 
Grønning shows that at Toyota, the group leader, one level up from the team leader, 
determines how long each task can take and also the order of operations that make up 
the task (Grønning, 1992: 119). This means that control over workers' actions is 
located two levels up in the hierarchy. 
Generally in the anti-Taylorist cases, at least some of the team members were 
involved in decision making. Three areas stood out: detail planning and scheduling of 
production, typically within a one week's time horizon; autonomously taking action 
when problems occurred instead of going to a supervisor; choosing team leaders. 
 
Difference in zeal for standardization 
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A core attraction of Taylorism is that it promises that the best possible method, "the 
one best way" will be used. Whether there exists a one best way to work may be a 
matter of philosophical debate. Taylor strongly believed in it.  
But also in highly modern discussions about organizational learning in the context of 
mass production we find this assumption. For example, Adler and Cole (1995: 169) 
write: “Standardization captures best practice and facilitates the diffusion of 
improvement ideas throughout the organization – you cannot diffuse what you have 
not standardized.” In this view, standardization means that, for each task X, the best 
way is determined and laid down in rules. Everyone who has to perform this task X, 
must follow the rules for X exactly. 
At Toyota, standardization is the basis of everything, even of the use of teams. 
Grønning writes:  
 
 The main reason for the use of teams is that this unit corresponds to one of the 
standardized processes – for example the sub-assembly of a particular 
component - when standardizations are decided. The group leader will then 
standardize each and every one of the minute tasks that are needed in order to 
complete the process, thereby utilizing standardized work as the administrative 
basis for his group and his teams. This administrative basis then has 
implications on the day-to-day management of the workplace, such as in 
formulating a program for making the workers multifunctional enough to 
handle several of the standardized tasks. (Grønning, 1992: 32)  
 
Standardization is never permanent, but always the basis for further improvement 
(Grønning, 1992: 32).  
In the anti-Taylorist cases, there was no obsession with standardization. Leaving 
autonomy on the shop floor level implies that there is no enforcement of a one best 
way. There will be variation between teams in the way of working. An example is the 
IHC shipyard in the Netherlands. A change program involved the creation of semi-
autonomous teams. Teams had to choose coordinators and the idea was that all team 
members should perform all tasks. Special training courses were part of the program. 
One of the teams in the IHC machine factory chose not to have any coordinators, they 
were happy when they got rid of their bosses. They did not participate in the courses 
either. They also disregarded the official line of diminishing the division of labor by 
keeping a special person around who did nothing but removing burrs. Management 
accepted this, since this team’s performance was on a par with the other team in the 
same workshop that did participate in all aspects of the change program.  
Adler and Cole (1995) claimed that standardization is essential for organizational 
learning. This implies that, in anti-Tayloristic teamworking, to the extent that 
standardization is not being pursued, organizational learning is impossible. Adler and 
Cole’s (1995) analysis ultimately depends on the assumption that there is “one best 
way”. Even if this assumption is relaxed, in anti-Tayloristic teamworking, organizing 
cross-team learning remains a challenge  
 
Power balance in the employment relation 
The Japanese organization of production has been described as "simply the practice of 
the organizational principles of Fordism under conditions in which management 
prerogatives are largely unlimited" (Dohse, Jürgens et al., 1985: 141). Specifically, 
compared to classical Taylorism, managers are more likely to make arbitrary 
decisions. This reflects in the Japanese notion of competitiveness. Competitiveness 
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means permanent rationalization even at economically good times and flexible, vague 
working arrangements without precedent-setting agreements (Grønning, 1992: 3). 
This involves Taichi Ohno’s “Oh! No!” method in which workloads are calculated at 
100-110 per cent. This makes overtime a structural requirement. Through kaizen this 
overtime is reduced. Subsequently managers increase workloads (Grønning, 1992: 
27). 
In anti-Tayloristic teamworking, management accepts at least some measure of 
worker control. Also, there are limits set to management prerogatives, in the shape of 
agreements that not only confer obligations on the workers but also bind management. 
I would not want to describe anti-Tayloristic teamworking as a stunning triumph of 
organizational democracy; at any rate, there are at least examples that show some 
worker control. 
In some of the cases, unions played an active role in job design. A good example of 
this is the Volvo car plant in Uddevalla. Initially, the plan was to set up the Uddevalla 
factory with a system of computer controlled carriers as used in the Volvo plant in 
Kalmar. Intervention from CEO Gyllenhammar and pressure from the unions led to a 
more radical solution. The metal workers' union took part in the designing of the 
factory from the start. Six shop stewards were members of the project group preparing 
the design of the factory. They played an active role in the brainstorm sessions, and 
not only defended the interests of union members, but also contributed their 
experience as carmakers. The final design for the factory showed a more radical 
departure from the assembly line concept than the Kalmar plant did. 
In a few cases, there were indications that work teams can achieve such a level of 
autonomy, that the labor process becomes a black box for management. To the 
workers, this can be a source of power. This occurred in the IHC shipyard. A HR staff 
member explained: "The teams in final assembly [of ships] work most independently. 
Often, customers come directly to them. They like to mount things before 
management knows about it. That the boss says 'but it cannot be mounted yet' and that 
they can say 'but it is already in place!’ Management lost track of what they are doing. 
They exploited this position already twice by threatening to strike, with the argument 
that they had taken over tasks that once were part of much more well paid jobs. They 
got their pay raise. Managers accept their independence because things are going so 
well." 
 
Technical and logistical context 
In terms of autonomy, assembly line production is at the low end of the scale. In the 
anti-Tayloristic cases, engineers and managers struggled to find ways to abolish the 
assembly line or the modify it to increase worker autonomy. Most common was the 
introduction of buffers and of dock-assembly (i.e. off-line assembly). 
In the neo-Tayloristic team concept, as seen by managers and designers, short cycled 
machine paced work is not a problem.  
 
Wage system 
Bonuses that make up a substantial part of the wage are a powerful tool for 
controlling employee behavior. In Japanese companies bonuses tend to represent a 
large proportion of the wage packet (up to 50 per cent). Individual bonuses are based 
on assessments by the supervisor on how deeply a worker cooperates in the system. 
Group bonuses are also given (cf. Dohse, Jürgens et al., 1985: 137-138). 
In the companies pursuing anti-Taylorist teamworking, the idea of group bonus 
systems in the form of additional wage was generally unpopular. Works councils 
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feared that teams would push out weaker workers. In some cases (Holec, manufacture 
of electrical equipment; Van Nelle, tobacco processing), teams received bonuses that 
they must use collectively. At Van Nelle, one team decided to use their bonus for 
buying ventilators, another team decided to spend it on a stereo system for their 
department. However, a Holec manager experienced: "Something like this works only 
for a short time. The renewal must come from inside." At IHC, there is no group 
bonus for performance: "We still assume that everyone does his best. After a terrific 
performance there is cake for the entire production personnel." In several of the anti-
Taylorist cases, there were specially designed wage systems for encouraging learning. 
A few examples are: In the Volvo Uddevalla plant, pay was related to the proportion 
of a car that an employee could assemble. However, this only applied up to a certain 
degree. Consequently, learning to assemble an entire car was not encouraged 
financially. In the paint factory of Sigma Coatings, pay was based on knowledge 
rather than performance. At IHC, every course out of the training program, that was 
successfully completed, led to a pay supplement. Typically, these schemes were laid 
down in rules that preclude arbitrary management decisions. 
 
Brave new teams 
Some authors suggest that autonomy in teamworking is a managerial control 
strategy that works through installing self-discipline (an internalized iron cage), 
making employees see themselves as entrepreneurs, obscuring the employment 
relationship and strengthening identification with the organization. Such a control 
strategy would be cheaper and more insidious than classical direct control. Sennett 
(1998: 56) argues that in an organization that is based on semi-autonomous teams, 
there still is a power center that allocates tasks and sets production goals. This makes 
management-by-stress easy to accomplish. The exercise of power becomes less 
clearly visible, but no less strong. Bourdieu (1998) paints a scenario in which teams of 
flex-workers compete against each other, while self-management leads to over-
involvement and consequently to self-exploitation. This all happens under hierarchical 
direction. Burawoy (1985: 151) qualifies the type of change initiatives that I have 
termed “anti-Tayloristic” as an “attempt to invade the spaces created by workers 
under the previous regime and to mobilize consent to increased productivity." 
Willmott (1993: 523) sees shop floor autonomy as "the development of a 
'second nature', in the form of a normative framework, through which the bogey of 
indeterminacy is practically exorcized". He points out that in the newspeak of 
corporate culture, there is “simultaneous affirmation and negation of the conditions of 
autonomy" which he sees as “seductive doublethink” (Willmott, 1993: 526). 
As of yet, there is little evidence for the proposition that granting autonomy is, 
by itself, a managerial control strategy that both is cheaper and more insidious than 
classical direct control.  
Appelbaum, et al. (2000: 184) report survey results that indicate that “high 
performance work systems” enhance organizational commitment. Kuhlmann and 
Schumann (2001) found that the introduction of teamworking comes with more 
willingness to contribute to reorganizations for increasing competitiveness. Workers 
tend to stop assuming that change automatically hurts their interests. Feelings that “all 
are in the same boat” increase. However, the workers’ critical attitude towards 
management proved to remain intact. 
Several case studies exist that demonstrate a link between, on the one hand, 
teamworking and, on the other hand, increased pressure to raise output (Ezzamel and 
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Willmott, 1998, Barker, 1993, Pollert, 1996). Following the critical theorists, one 
would expect these case studies to show the effects of over-involvement, self-
exploitation, mobilization of consent, normative control or seduction. Instead, they 
show the effects of financial incentives, financial discipline and a development away 
from autonomy respectively. In Ezzamel and Willmott's (1998) case study in the 
apparel industry, it was a team-based bonus system that brought managers the 
production increase that they desired. In Pollert's (1996) case study of teamworking in 
a food-manufacturing factory, the devolvement of budgetary control to first line 
managers was the decisive management tool. Barker's (1993) case study in the 
electronics industry describes how, inside teams, formalized rules developed that 
became more and more rigid. However, in this case the key change was a shift from 
team leader rotation to having one permanent “facilitator” per team. What we see here 
is not the use of autonomy as a control tool but the re-emergence of a more Taylorist 
structure. This phenomenon, the crystallization of a more Taylorist way of working 
was not uncommon in the companies that I studied. A few examples: at the Van Nelle 
tobacco processing plant, team coordinators eventually took on all the managerial 
tasks that had been devolved to the teams. According to a Van Nelle manager, one of 
the coordinators acted as a foreman: "Inside his work group, he formed a Tayloristic 
bunch, of which he is the foreman." In the shipbuilding units of IHC, temporary 
workers did more and more work; in some teams the proportion came close to 100 per 
cent. This caused team coordinators to act as bosses. It could happen that one welder, 
leading a group of temporary workers, put a whole section together. In the production 
islands of Felten & Guillaume, one found unskilled workers ("Ungelernte"), semi-
skilled workers ("Angelernte"), skilled workers ("Facharbeiter") and foremen 
("Meister") working together. Within the islands, there developed a division of labor 
between these categories of workers. On the basis of available evidence, autonomy in 
team working seems more of an unstable characteristic than a key part of a 
sophisticated management control strategy. 
Likewise, it is unclear whether autonomy helps forging consensus. Consensus was 
certainly at the heart of the anti-Tayloristic cases. However, from the outset in these 
cases management and employees consented on the desirability of team working. 
Typically, works councils of union clubs supported its introduction. And we need to 
remind ourselves that a Taylorist system can produce consent as well (Burawoy, 
1979). 
Finally, one of the cases, container manufacturer Rietbergwerke in Germany, 
highlights problems in concertive control. After years of trying to work with 
coordinator rotation, the Rietbergwerke reintroduced foremen ("Meister"). In the 
beginning, the system of coordinator rotation worked well. Workers proved that they 
were up to it. But soon problems arose, when coordinators had to take unpopular 
decisions. When the person affected by such a decision would later take over the 
coordination role, he would get back at the previous coordinator. For this reason, 
coordinators grew ever more careful and more reluctant to make decisions. Besides, 
cliques formed that picked the best pieces of work for themselves. A manager 
explained: "This led to tensions that the workers took home with them. The former 
coordinators were not angry when the system was abolished. They were taking the 
conflicts home with them, and deep down they felt relieved. But the job enrichment 
was gone. For years we had tried to hold on to the coordinator system, but the mood 
worsened and worsened. The works council, too, felt that it could not go on like this. 
The abolishment meant a drop in pay; coordinators were making DM 200 per month 
more. The collective agreement, after the project had been extended to three of four 
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years, was canceled." Employing foremen ("Meister") was expensive, but 
management and works council felt that there was no other choice, due to the 
inefficiencies caused by the social frictions on the shop floor.  
Neo-Taylorism and the end of history 
Is anti-Taylorism restricted to doomed experiments while neo-Taylorism is the 
wave of the future? Especially in the car industry, the current outlook is neo-
Tayloristic. Volvo closed anti-Tayloristic car plants; generally in the automobile 
industry, there is a resurrection of the assembly line (Schumann et al., 1989, Pruijt, 
1997: 112, Shimokawa, Jürgens and Fujimoto, 1997, Springer, 1999).  
This is extra significant because, historically, job design paradigms tend to 
spread from the car industry: the assembly line from Ford, semi- autonomous teams 
from Volvo and lean production from Toyota.  
For example in the Mercedes-Benz plant in Bremen, the path of using dock 
assembly in parts of the production system was discontinued. When the time came to 
install a new production system (for the C-class cars), management chose an assembly 
line system. 
In 1999, corporate management at Mercedes-Benz felt that their current 
strategy for rationalization was too much based on responsible autonomy, while in 
Japanese plants standard worksheets were important for productivity. These standard 
worksheets specify the order of operations and the time allowed for them. The 
reasoning behind this boiled down to this: when granted autonomy, workers in mass 
production do not put in a maximum effort (Springer, 1999). 
Gearbox factory ZF in Germany had become famous among researchers because of an 
anti-Tayloristic flexible manufacturing system and corresponding organization of 
work, developed as part of the Humanization of Work program (Schultz-Wild et al., 
1986). One of the features was an integration of supervision of the installation, setting 
up system components, quality control, adjustment of tools, adaptation of Numerical 
Control-programs and creation of work schedules. Among these tasks were not only 
the typical residual tasks that remain after automation, but also tasks that are usually 
split off from the operator's job and handled by special departments (Schultz-Wild et 
al., 1986: 523). Employees worked in teams, each team being responsible for a 
production island. Workers did not have permanent workstations; the team allocated 
tasks. The researchers, who followed the project over the course of ten years, made a 
clear statement as to what extent this new system departs from the usual way of 
working. They found the new system, from the point of view of organization of work, 
work content, personnel administration and qualification demands, to be "in sharp 
contrast with the tendencies that have for decades dominated the rationalization of 
production work" (Schultz-Wild et al., 1986: 519). Later, however, management 
became disappointed with anti-Tayloristic teamworking because of the high wages 
commanded by the highly skilled operators. The next strategy was to try out advanced 
automation. This turned out to be an expensive solution because of maintenance cost. 
Then, ZF engineers had the opportunity to look inside a Japanese gearbox factory. A 
ZF manager observed: "One man operated seven or eight machines and they worked 
like ants. In Europe you cannot introduce this in one sweep, it has to happen step by 
step. The Japanese factory was only half automated. Robots were simple, making 
them easier to program." Management felt that this was the way to go. 
Thus, in the automobile industry there was competition between the two 
models. Neo-Tayloristic teamworking had the upper hand. Small cracks in its armor 
were visible. Totsuka (1995) presents survey evidence that shows a decline in 
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Japanese auto worker job satisfaction from 1985 to 1990, concluding that there is a 
need for reform of the lean production system. Recruitment difficulties have prompted 
the introduction of some buffers (Benders, 1996). Moreover, Toyota increased the 
proportion of ability-based pay (Shimizu, 1998: 62). 
Also, information on overseas transplants of Japanese companies indicates that 
not all features of the model were easily replicated outside Japan. For example, at the 
NUMMI (New United Motor Manufacturing, inc, a U.S. joint venture of Toyota and 
General Motors) plant, workers could refuse to rotate. At Toyota this was not possible 
(Grønning, 1992: 143). At GM in the UK and in Spain, the introduction of neo-
Tayloristic teamworking met with union opposition (Stewart and Lucio, 1998). The 
unions succeeded in putting constraints on the development of lean production 
arrangements; resistance did not result in a shift toward anti-Tayloristic teamworking.  
Outside the automobile industry, however, there were few indications of competition 
between the models. Nevertheless, anti-Tayloristic team structures proved to be 
relatively unstable. One of the mechanisms involved is spontaneous Taylorization 
inside teams, which I have already mentioned in the previous section. Where 
spontaneous Taylorization does not occur, horizontal coordination may lead to stress, 
as in the Rietbergwerke (see previous section). Stress can also result when a particular 
implementation of anti-Tayloristic teamworking is over-ambitious in terms of skill 
demands. When production work is supplemented with management tasks, workers 
need social and literacy skills. In some cases, an unexpected lack in this area caused 
stress. In another case, management carefully assessed available skills prior to the 
introduction of anti-Tayloristic teamworking, and hired instructors to provided 
training.  
Anti-Tayloristic teamworking was never in the mainstream. This implies that it is 
vulnerable to contingencies like mergers, restructuring, resignation of key persons 
(both managers and union officials) and financial troubles. 
Conclusions 
The concept of teamworking is the product of two distinct developments. One: 
a neo-Tayloristic form of organization of work, of which Toyota has shown that it can 
be very profitable, was packaged and reframed to make it acceptable to the Western 
public. Two: anti-Tayloristic ways of organizing work, inspired by ideals of 
organizational democracy, were relabeled to make them acceptable to profit-oriented 
managers.  
It is useful, as several other authors do, to preserve the double lineage of 
teamworking by distinguishing two different types. I have called these neo-Tayloristic 
and anti-Tayloristic teamworking.  
Key concerns in the teamworking literature are intensification of work and the 
use of shop floor autonomy as a cosmetic or manipulative device. Indeed, all the 
features of neo-Tayloristic teamworking are geared towards the intensification of 
work. However, one of the intensification mechanisms, the removal of Tayloristic 
rigidities in the division of labor, applies to anti-Tayloristic teamworking as well. On 
the other hand, the difference in terms of autonomy between neo-Tayloristic and anti-
Tayloristic teamworking is real. The instability and vulnerability of anti-Tayloristic 
teamworking imply that it can only develop and flourish when managers and 
employee representatives put determined effort into it. The opportunity structure for 
this contains both economic and political elements. In mass production, the economic 
success of Toyota, through skillful mediation by management gurus, makes the 
opportunity structure for anti-Tayloristic teamworking relatively unfavorable. Outside 
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of mass production it is much better; widespread knowledge about the possibilities for 
organizational choice could improve the opportunity structure for anti-Tayloristic 
teamworking. Nevertheless, the overlap between the two types of teamworking - 
intensification of work by the removal of Tayloristic rigidities in the division of labor 
– poses a structural dilemma for employee representatives.  
 
                                                 
1 As Appelbaum and Batt (1994) show, anti-Tayloristic team structures can be 
found in the US. 
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